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A rich theory literature predicts mixed strategies in posted prices due to standard price discrim-
ination, search frictions, and various other rationales. While typically interpreted as implying
occasional sales or price dispersion, online marketplacesenable a firm to truly use randomiza-
tion as a tool in pricing, and so such behavior should be expected to arise in online settings. We
investigate a case of mixed pricing across a large subset of products on a major e-commerce
website. We first test for randomizing behavior, and then construct a model of price discrimi-
nation that would generate randomization as optimal behavior. We estimate the model and use
it to assess pricing effects of a proposed merger in the industry.
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1 Introduction
A rich theoretical literature establishes equilibria involving mixed strategies in posted prices for
firms in various settings, such as when search costs are present or consumers differ in their will-
ingness to pay and mixed strategy pricing serves to price discriminate. These models of mixed
pricing are typically motivated by empirical cases of pricemixing either over space, or over time:
the search literature going back toStigler (1961) interprets e.g., geographic price dispersion as a
realization of mixed strategies, while the sales literature beginning withVarian (1980) views oc-
casional sales as realizations of mixed strategies. However, the advent of online marketplaces has
made the idea of mixed pricing strategies feasible in real time: firms can play pricing strategies that
had previously only been theorized. This paper describes and analyzes a case of a firm engaging
in mixed pricing behavior for a significant subset of products in a $10B USD online marketplace.
The industry we study is office supplies. Previous academic work (Ashenfelter et al. 2006;
Cabral 2003; Baker 1999; Warren-Boulton and Dalkir 2001) has investigated pricing practices in
this retail market, primarily as they relate to concentration n local markets. For the past few
decades, there were three nationwide office supply specialty hains in operation: Staples, Office
Depot, and OfficeMax. On Sept 4, 1996, Staples and Office Depotannounced a merger, although
it was subsequently challenged and halted by the FTC in 1997 out of a concern over substantially
reduced competition between office supply superstores in var ous local markets where the firms
directly compete against each other, without facing competitiv pressure from unrelated rivals.1
In early 2013, Office Depot and OfficeMax announced a merger, which was permitted in light of
declining demand and increased external competition from substitute retail industries like discount
stores, warehouse clubs, and online general merchandisers. Finally in 2015, Staples proposed a
merger with the combined Office Depot-OfficeMax entity, which s currently under review with a
decision expected December 8th, 2015.
A second aspect of pricing by Staples, the largest player, that has been scrutinized in the pop-
ular press such as the Wall Street Journal2 (WSJ) is its recent surreptitious tailoring of prices on
its website based on its customers’ locations, in this case zip codes. Accordingly, the website
randomizes between showing a potential buyer one of two prices for a given product - a “high”
price and a “low” price - with different probabilities in different zip codes. Consumers visiting
the website are not directly aware of which price they are seeing, and computer science research
indicates it is quite difficult to detect such price discrimination in online markets more broadly
(Mikians et al. 2012). This strategy may inadvertently harm or help consumers who happen to live
1Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066(D.D.C. 1997) grants the FTC’s motion for a
preliminary injunction.
2“Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information”,Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Jeremy Singer-Vine and
Ashkan Soltani, Dec 24 2012.
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in areas with particular market conditions by altering prices they face. This may improve efficiency
when prices are lowered for certain consumers, or may simplyreallocate consumer surplus to firm
profits if prices rise. The net effect of this is an empirical object that depend on competitors and
local market demand conditions.
Such pricing strategies are to be expected going forward in onli e marketplaces. However, for
policy makers, such price discrimination strategies also have implications for merger analysis. As
we show below, one particular local market condition that the firm explicitly takes into account is
the consumer’s distance to the nearest of its rivals’ brick-and mortar outlets. If two competitors
merge and reduce the number of offline locations they operate, the distributional effect of this form
of price discrimination will thus also change. For example,th combined OfficeMax-Office Depot
corporation announced in 2014 that of its 1,900 retail locati ns, at least 400 would close by the end
of 2016, which would then alter prices faced by online consumers in affected markets.3 If Staples
were then to acquire the merged rival, the change in competition could have a significant effect on
online pricing.
In this paper, we introduce three datasets on pricing in office supplies: first, a “breadth” sample
of the high-price display frequency for a single product across all zip codes. Second, a “depth”
sample of the same pricing frequency, together with the highand low prices, across a large set of
products, but for a small set of zip codes. Finally, an “offline” sample of in-store prices for a small
set of products at the three major chains in 17 different cities, for a total of 85 store locations.
We document trends in the first dataset, such as how consumerswho are close to a rival store
location are more likely to see low prices compared to consumers in zip codes that are far from
rival chains. In the second dataset, we test directly for randomization behavior, and show that there
are no systematic time trends nor serial correlation in the observed prices. We also show that the
pricing strategy is statistically identical among the set of pr ducts that exhibit randomization. We
show in the third dataset that variation in in-store pricingis small and uncorrelated with variation
in online pricing.
We then propose a model of price discrimination that rational zes firm randomization. Our
model has “loyal” and “disloyal” consumers, as well as a search parameter among “disloyal” types.
We calibrate certain demand parameters and estimate the remaining structural parameters relating
to the randomization strategy. Our estimates show that the implied share of loyal customers for
Staples.com is increasing in the distance to the nearest rival chain, and that disloyal types exit the
market more quickly as the number of establishments in the zip code increases. Our estimates
imply small but reasonable distance elasticities.
We then proceed with an analysis of how such online pricing behavior changes after a merger
of Staples’ rivals. We use data on post-integration store closures of the merged Office Depot-
3“Office Depot, Inc. Announces First Quarter 2014 Results”, Office Depot Press Release, May 6 2014.
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OfficeMax entity to re-estimate optimal price discrimination for Staples.com, and find that average
prices displayed increase by a modest amount compared to pre-merger levels. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that rival store closures have the primary effect of removing duplication in
the chains’ footprints. However, this is important to highlt as merger review in the industry
focused on in-store pricing changes from an increase in market power and elasticities of substitu-
tion between the three specialty players and unrelated online competitors, but not on within-firm
multi-channel pricing.
This paper revisits an extensive theoretic literature on search and sales, as well as growing
empirical search and sales literatures. It makes a contribution to the literature on testing mixed
strategies (Walker and Wooders, 2001; Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose, 2002; Wang, 2009), and
also highlights the existence of online price discrimination and its interaction with offline prices.
We review the related literature in more detail below.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relatedlit rature. Section 3 describes
the setting and current merger activity. Section 4 introduces our datasets. Section 5 tests for
randomization. Section 6 analyzes the relation between onli e price mixing and the offline market
structure, and rival prices more generally. Section 7 describes and estimates a model of firm pricing
behavior. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature on Mixed Pricing
There is a rich theory literature that explores firms using mixed strategies in equilibrium. We focus
on strategies for posted price, recognizing that the auction literature has studied mixed strategies
extensively in the context of bids.
A first stream of literature, going back toStigler(1961), explores price dispersion and the im-
plication for consumer search.Salop and Stiglitz(1977) andSalop(1977) considered how hetero-
geneity in search costs can lead to price dispersion as a toolfor price discrimination. Subsequent
work such asBurdett and Judd(1983) andStahl(1989) modeled consumer search behavior more
closely. Recent contributions have revisited competitiveaspects (Janssen and Moraga-González,
2004) as well as informational settings (Akin and Platt, 2013). There have been a number of im-
portant empirical contributions that have used price patterns to identify search costs, such as in
Hong and Shum(2006) or Hortaçsu and Syverson(2004), and the relative importance of search in
observed prices (Wildenbeest, 2011).
A second stream of literature on mixed strategies in prices began withVarian(1980) who shows
that in competing over “informed” and “uninformed” consumers, firms employ mixed strategies.
Subsequent papers such asSobel(1984) andConlisk, Gerstner and Sobel(1984) further the intu-
ition that occasionally offering low prices allows a firm to “sweep” the low types of customers from
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a market. Later works such asRaju, Srinivasan and Lal(1990), Rao(1991) andSinitsyn(2008)
refined models to showing which types of firms should have low prices more often and how many
different prices they needed to charge. A recent contribution, Chevalier and Kashyap(2012), ex-
amines both theoretically and empirically price variationacross a retailer’s product line, highlight-
ing the interplay between price dispersion and substitution patterns between products. Significant
empirical contributions includePesendorfer(2002) andHendel and Nevo(2013), which show that
intertemporal price discrimination is an effective strategy to differentiate between types in storable
goods settings, whileHendel and Nevo(2006) highlights the impact of ignoring such behavior in
traditional demand analysis.
In the sales literature, several papers have considered therelat d decision of uniform (“Every
Day Low Pricing”, or EDLP) versus occasional promotion (“HiLo”) pricing, as inLal and Rao
(1997) andHo, Tang and Bell(1998); Fassnacht and Husseini(2013) offers a review. Other work
has explored sale pricing through the lens of reference prices, such as inHeidhues and Koszegi
(2008), where the authors show that a monopolist selling to risk-averse consumers can maximize
profits by varying between “high” and “low” prices.
Empirical work in mixed strategies has primarily focused ontesting for mixed strategies, par-
ticularly in sports (Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose, 2002; Walker and Wooders, 2001) but also in
conduct (Wang, 2009). These papers test assumptions of randomized play, includi g the predictive
power of covariates and the absence of serial correlation. In addition, they test model predictions
of equality of payoffs. We are not aware of any research looking at randomization of posted prices
in real time.
We take no stand on which particular thread of literature explains the behavior we document.
Instead, we focus on testing for the behavior and documenting its patterns across products and
its relation to offline prices. We build a model inspired by the “sweeping” price discrimination
mechanism ofSobel(1984) to gain a sense of the magnitude of potential pricing effects of market
structure, in the context of the past and proposed mergers.
3 Setting
As of 2013, there were 9,000 office supply specialty stores inthe US. Most of these are small,
standalone retailers, such as stationary stores, but 42% are owned and operated by one of the three
large supply super store chains, Office Depot, OfficeMax and Staples, whose combined estimated
market share is upward of 70%. The majority of the firms’ revenue derives from the sale of school
and office supplies (45%) and office machines (29%), but they also sell computers, furniture and
other supplies. Among them, Staples is the market leader, opating 1,846 outlets in 2013, fol-
lowed by Office Depot with 1,089 and OfficeMax with 823 outletsbased on the chain affiliation of
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outlets prior to the companies’ merger in late 2013 (see ibisworld.com; firm counts derived from
companies’ 2013 annual reports.)
Similar to other retail industries, the recession of the lat2000s resulted in sharp declines in
demand. The retail chains responded to this, and the additional challenge of increasing external
competition from substitute industries like discount stores, warehouse clubs, and online retailers by
successfully consolidating. In 2013, Office Depot and OfficeMax proposed and obtained approval
to merge; in 2015 Staples and the newly formed entity proposed a further merger that is currently
undergoing review.
This follows the earlier proposed merger in 1996 by Staples and Office Depot, a case that the
FTC successfully challenged based on concerns and econometric evidence that the merger would
substantially reduce competition in the retail sale of office supply superstores in various local
markets throughout the country where the firms competed directly against each other. The FTC’s
case at the time applied a narrow market definition that focused on office supply superstores as a
separate market from other office supply specialty stores orgeneral big box retailers. Within local
MSA markets, the FTC’s evidence suggested that (a) Staples and Office Depot had competed on
price before, and that (b) in-store pricing was heavily influenced by the number of other office
superstores competing in the local area, where fewer storesled to higher prices.Ashenfelter et al.
(2006) present some of the detail behind the FTC’s evidence, andManuszak and Moul(2008)
develop a two-stage model of pricing for three representative products, using local market structure
as a proxy for competition and instrumenting for the latter nonlinearly using the firms’ spatial
expansion pattern relative to their headquarters as determinants of equilibrium market structure
outcomes. Both show evidence in clear support of the FTC’s arguments; we rely on their pricing
models to identify demand shifters for the empirical specifications we present below.
The FTC’s approval of the later Office Depot and OfficeMax merger concluded that in the in-
tervening years, the market for consumer office supplies hadc nged significantly, as a result of
which the merger of the two office supply superstore chains waunlikely to substantially lessen
competition in consumable office supplies sales. The FTC’s revised market definition included
non-office supply superstores such as Wal-Mart and Target, along with club stores like Costco and
Sam’s Club, and online retailers of office supplies, most notably Amazon.com, that had grown
quickly and significantly since the time of the earlier case and now compete with office supply
superstores due to larger office supply product lines. The FTC separately investigated the poten-
tial impact of the proposed merger on the sale of consumable office supplies to large regional or
national business customers on a contract basis, a market with fe er potential suppliers capable of
meeting their large purchasing requirements, but concluded that the merger was unlikely to sub-
stantially lessen competition in the contract channel.4 The office supply contract market is one
4See https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/clo ing_letters/office-depot-inc./officemax-
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focus of the ongoing investigation of the proposed merger ofStaples and the combined Office De-
pot/OfficeMax entity; the 2013 decision noted that the merged company would still face significant
competition from Staples for this business.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our analysis relies on three data sets. The first one derives from the WSJ’s investigation into Sta-
ples’ pricing practices.5 As part of a larger investigation into online retailers’ price discrimination
practices based for example on a customer’s physical IP address location, the WSJ showcased
Staples.com as a typical example: during the period of the WSJ’s study from September to De-
cember 2012, the report found that Staples.com’s displayedprice depended on the zip code of the
computer’s IP address location. Zip codes got either a “high” price or a “low” price with some
probability, with high and low prices differing by roughly 10% based on a large set of representa-
tive products (these included more than 1,000 different products in 10 selected zip codes - typical
examples are a Swingline Stapler, a 12-pack of BIC Rollerball Pens, a 15-pack of Staples-Brand
Mailing Tubes, a 24-pack of Intertape Masking Tape, and a Snap afe-Brand Safe). To demonstrate
the pricing practice, the WSJ published on its website a dataset it compiled during its investigation
that recorded for each of approximately 42,000 US zip codes th fraction of times Staples.com
displayed the high price for the Swingline stapler out of 20 simulated visits to the Staples.com
website from a potential customer in that zip code. We denotethis data set as the “Breadth” sam-
ple in our analysis below, which contains, for each zip code the fraction of times out of the 20
shopping occasions a simulated visitor saw the high price app r. We denote this high-price score
as f ∈ {0,0.05,0.1, ...,0.95,1}. Figure1 displays the distribution of the frequency with which
Staples displays the high price for the stapler in 29,545 standard continental US zip codes. For
approximately 7.5% of these zip codes, Staples never display the high price; similarly, for ap-
proximately 5% of zip codes, it always displays the high price. The remaining distribution is
bimodal, with approximately 35% of zip codes seeing the highprice between 5-15% of the time,
while Staples.com displays the high price between 65-75% ofthe time in around 23% of zip codes.
inc./131101officedepotofficemaxstatement.pdf .
5Additional credit should be given to computer science researchers who expose such practices, such as
Mikians et al.(2012) which shows significant variation in prices resulting fromlocation, cookie data, and equipment.
Mikians et al.(2013) presents results of a fascinating experiment that gathered price data from users with a certain
browser toolbar, and found widespread price differences onma y popular websites.
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Figure 1: Empirical Probability Distribution of High Price
Notes: Figure displays empirical probability distribution f observing the high price for a given
product in a given zip code on a given day. Distribution constructed across products and zip codes.
We complement the “Breadth” sample from the WSJ with a similar data set that we assembled
subsequently to the WSJ’s reporting for a larger set of products. We used the 2012-2013 comScore
Web Behavior data base to identify a set of 268 products that comScore customers purchased from
Staples.com immediately prior to our data collection effort. We constructed a web scraping routine
that began by loading the Staples.com web page, which created a tracking “cookie”. This cookie
contained a field called “zipcode”, which stored a value thatwe believe was estimated based on
the machine’s IP address. We overwrote the zip code field withthe targeted zip code and then re-
loaded the page and saved the resulting html file. Figure7 shows the contents of a typical “cookie”,
with the zip code field located towards the end. We used this routine to query Staples.com eight
times over a period of 4 weeks in April and May of 2013 to recordprices for the comScore sam-
ple of products from a set of 21 zip codes representing each high-price score from the “Breadth”
sample, for a total of over 45,000 queries.6 We then parsed the resulting html files using regu-
lar expressions in Perl to extract the price that was displayed, as well as whether or not the price
was specifically marked as a “sale” price. Among the 268 products, 135 show one price across
6Later in 2013, the firm redesigned its website and there is currently no detectable effect of the contents of the
zipcode field in the cookie. While it is possible that they have discontinued this pricing strategy, potentially in response
to the news coverage it received, it is also plausible that they simply store location data on their servers instead of in
cookies, making it impossible to manipulate the latter.
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the set of test zip codes, 130 show two prices, 3 show three pric s. We drop any scrape results
that explicitly declare that the product is offered at a “sale” price. Focusing on the products for
which we observe two distinct non-sale prices during the data collection period, we observe the
high price being displayed in 35.5% of the 8 price collectionr unds. The relative frequency with
which the high price is shown in a zip code among our 8 price scrapes is correlated with the WSJ’s
distribution in Figure1, although imperfectly due to the different number of scrapes. Similar to
the WSJ, we observe a discount from the high to the low price with two modes - 5% and 10% -
with an average price difference of 8% and a median of 8.2%. There are few systematic patterns
in which of the 268 products are sold using mixed pricing, as opposed to a single uniform price.
Correlating the incidence of price mixing with product attributes - the product’s category (office
supplies, furniture, electronics excluding computers, computers, etc.), whether or not the product
is a Staples’ store brand, and the price point of the product -suggests that mixing is concentrated
among office supply products, but controlling for product category, there are no statistically signif-
icant differences between the types of products that have uniform prices versus mixed prices. We
denote the resulting sample as the “Depth sample”.
Lastly, we collect information on offline prices across a number of local markets to be able to
investigate the extent to which Staples’ online prices relate to its own in-store prices or respond to
its rivals’ off-line prices. We hired mystery shoppers fromthe website TaskRabbit.com, an online
marketplace that allows users to outsource small jobs to others in their local area, in November
2014. At the time, TaskRabbit had a presence in 18 cities across the continental US. For each of
the cities, we assembled a sample of six stores – two for each offi e supply super store chain – that
differed in Staples.com’s high-price frequency score based on the store’s zip code, but that were
sufficiently close to each other to limit driving time by the mystery shoppers. We provided shoppers
with a standardized set of five products (Post-Its, a stapler, Scotch tape, pens, and address labels),
including pictures and SKUs, and instructed them to record the price for each of the products in
each of the stores. Separately, we asked them to record the price fo the products on each of the
chain’s online shopping platform from their own home zip code. The final data collection effort
resulted in price information from 85 stores. The store sample is smaller than the potential sample
of 108 stores (18 markets with six stores each) for a number ofreasons. First, we were unable to
collect price information in Denver, CO, due to bad weather;s cond, not all three chains operate in
all markets, for example, Office Depot did not have presence iBoston, MA prior to its merger with
OfficeMax; and third, as the data collection took place shortly after the Office Depot/OfficeMax
merger, the chains had already begun to re-optimize their merged store network and closed stores
in some of the markets. This resulted both in us sending the mystery shoppers to fewer stores in
those markets, and them reporting back store closures amongthe stores we sent them to for six out
of our original set of stores. We have no reason to believe that the store reconfigurations or the
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chains’ aggregate market exit patterns are systematicallyrelated to Staples.com’s online pricing
strategy, as we discuss below. For the average store in the offline pricing sample, denoted as
“Offline” below, we observe 4.5 price observations, reflecting that despite our attempts to identify
popular, standardized products, not all of the products were available in all stores at the time of
the data collection. We also dropped price data reported by one of the mystery shoppers for one of
the chains since her reported price information indicated that she had recorded prices for incorrect
products. We further dropped price information for products that the mystery shoppers reported
to be on a general sale; this occurred for 8.61% of store-price observations. The resulting sample
thus consists of 410 price observations from 85 stores in 17 markets.
We add various supplemental data to these three main pricingdata sets. First, from Refer-
enceUSA.com, we construct a panel of each of three chains’ store locations across the continental
US as of the end of 2012, 2013, 2014, and mid-2015. We use the latest data primarily to investigate
in counterfactual simulations how Staples.com’s online pricing strategy would respond to an alter-
native offline store network that reflects post-merger reconfigurations. We also use ReferenceUSA
to collect information on the store networks of the more distant competitors identified by the FTC’s
investigation of the Office Depot/OfficeMax merger: we compile store locations for Walmart, Tar-
get, Costco, and Sam’s Club as of the date of our Breadth sample, the end of 2012. We use the
detailed longitude and latitude information provided by Refer nceUSA for each store’s location,
together with population-weighted centroids for each continental US zip code from the Missouri
Census Data Center’s MABLE/Geocorr2K data base to calculate straight-line distance between
each zip code and store location. From this master set, we then retain the distance between each
zip code and the closest store location for each competitor.
Lastly, we use the Census 2010 to collect demographic information at the zip code level, such
as income, wages, and presence of businesses.
4.1 Descriptive Evidence
Using the “Breadth” sample, we can explore patterns in the pricing behavior. Table1 shows de-
scriptive regressions of the probability of getting a “high” price in a zip code on i) the distance
from that zip code to the nearest Staples store location, ii)the distance to the nearest OfficeMax
or Office Depot location, and iii) the natural log of the number of establishments taken from the
census, as a proxy for local demand conditions and competitiveness. Store locations are likely to
be endogenous to both rival locations and local demand, and we see in the first three columns that
all three variables are related to the probability of being shown a “high” price. When we add all
variables at once, in the final column, we see that the probability of seeing a high price is increas-
ing in the distance to rival stores, and decreasing in the logof local establishments. In unreported
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regressions, we find that the distance to other less-direct competitors including Target, Costco, and
Sam’s Club is not related to the probability of “high” pricesin a zip code.
Table 1: Descriptive Regressions
Dependent Variable: Pr(High Price)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0002
Staples (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Distance to 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗
Nearest Rival (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Number of −0.0755∗∗∗ −0.0622∗∗∗ −0.0253∗∗∗
Establishments (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0046)
N 29,545 29,545 29,122 29,545 29,122 29,122
R2A 0.106 0.396 0.169 0.398 0.204 0.413
Notes: zip code-level regressions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are
denoted by∗, ∗∗, and∗∗∗.
In Figure2, we show the relationship between rival distance and high prices graphically. The
figure presents two binned scatterplots of the probability of being shown a “high” price in a given
zip code on the distance to the nearest rival store, where rivals are defined as OfficeMax and Office
Depot. The first panel is the raw data, while the second is residualized by the log of local estab-
lishments. In both we see an increasing relationship between distance to rival and the probability
of being shown a “high” price. The first panel seems to indicate that the effect is a step-function,
in that only rivals up to a distance of roughly 20 miles are relevant, although the second panel
shows a more linear relationship, consistent with the fact that rival locations and local demand are
confounded in the first.
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Figure 2: Descriptive Analysis of Online Prices
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Notes: Figures are “binned scatterplots”, constructed by residualizing the data against all listed
controls and adding back means, before plotting means of thedata within bins. Regression lines
are based on all underlying data, not only bin values.
Table 2: Joint Distribution of zip code distance to closest Staples location and closest rival location
Rival location
Staples location < 2 m 2-5 m 5-10 m 10-20 m > 20 m TOTAL
< 2 m 2.25 2.86 1.37 0.75 0.58 7.82
2-5 m 3.28 5.26 2.08 1.55 1.16 13.35
5-10 m 1.55 2.62 3.06 3.22 2.07 12.53
10-20 m 1.46 2.04 1.94 35.63 6.64 47.7
> 20 m 0.57 0.99 1.61 8.78 6.66 18.61
TOTAL 9.11 13.78 10.06 49.93 17.12 100
Notes: Table displays percent of zip codes whose distance tothe closest Staples location and
closest rival location falls within given distance bands inmiles.
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As we hope to exploit variation in distances from a zip code toStaples and its rivals, it is
important to show that the chains are not perfectly co-located with one another. Table2 shows that
while there is positive correlation in location choices of the three chains, there is still significant
variation in their location decisions.
One concern about this exercise is that Staples.com could simply be undertaking some exper-
imentation with price to learn demand. While we cannot conclusively disprove it, we believe this
is not the case. First, if it were simple A/B testing to learn demand responses, the level of random-
ization should not correlate with market characteristics.If instead it were a more recent machine
learning algorithm to learn demand, such as a multi-arm bandit “explore-exploit” algorithm, it
should be expected to correlate with prior beliefs on correct pri es; however it would not be neces-
sary to experiment on the entire country, and we would expectsystematic patterns in terms of which
products are randomized. Therefore, even though we cannot rule out the possibility of experimen-
tation, it appears less likely. Even if this was indeed a formf machine learning experimentation,
most of the contributions of this paper, including documenting how online prices correlate with
offline market conditions and the interplay between online ad offline pricing remain.
5 Testing for Randomization
Using our “Depth” sample of website scrapes, we can test for whether or not the observed pricing
behavior is consistent with randomization. As discussed above, different zip codes have different
patterns in the randomization. In Table3, we regress an indicator variable for seeing the “high”
price in a given website price query on different sets of fixedeffects. As can be seen in the bottom
row of the table, product and date-of-scrape fixed effects have little explanatory power, while zip
code fixed effects have a significant amount of power.
For this pricing behavior to be considered random, we must also show that there is no system-
atic pattern with respect to timing. In Table4, we add time-related fixed effects to see if they offer
any explanatory power. As shown, adding hour-of-day, minute-of-hour, and second-of-minute
fixed effects do nothing to explain high prices. Furthermore, tests of joint significance of the time
fixed effects fail to reject the null hypothesis, indicatingthat they collectively offer no explanatory
power.
Looking across products, we find the pricing behavior to be strikingly consistent, aside from a
small set of 6 outliers.7 Among the 122 non-outliers, the mean (median) rate of seeing“high” is
0.334 (0.333) with a 5%-95% range of 0.315 to 0.355. In a simple regression of an indicator for
7Three outliers that show high prices far more than others areunusual office supply purchases: store-brand aspirin,
acetaminophen and bath tissue. For the remaining three outli rs, we have far fewer price scrape observations, since
they were put on a uniform sale for a large portion of our time period and we drop all prices marked as sale prices.
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Table 3: What Explains a “High” Price?
Dependent Variable: Indicator for High Price
Fixed Effects for... (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product X X X
Date X X X
Zip code X X X X
N 18,101 18,101 18,101 18,101 18,101 18,101
Adj-R2 0.009 0.000 0.925 0.925 0.941 0.941
Notes: Linear probability models for observations from the“D pth” sample for products that
display two unique non-sale prices in our data.
Table 4: Timing of “High” Prices
Dependent Variable: Indicator for High Price
Fixed Effects for... (1) (2) (3) (4)
Zip code X X X X
Product X X X X
Hour of Day X X
Minute of Hour X X
Second of Minute X X
N 18,101 18,101 18,101 18,101
Adj-R2 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941
Number of Time Fixed Effects 15 60 60 135
Partial-F of Time Fixed Effects 1. 4 1.05 1.27 1.16
P-value of Partial-F 0.3127 0.3653 0.0775 0.1026
Notes: Linear probability models for observations from the“D pth” sample for products that
display two unique non-sale prices in our data.
high price on product fixed effects, an F-test of equality of all 122 product fixed effects yields a
test statistic of 0.10, and an associated P-value of 1.000, indicating that we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that all coefficients are equivalent.
Randomization further requires no serial correlation. Table 5 tests for serial dependence along
both the zip code and product panel dimensions, finding no predictive power of the last price
shown on the current price being shown. At the bottom of the table re test statistics for panel
autocorrelation proposed byWooldridge(2002), pp 282-283. We fail to find evidence of serial
correlation along either panel dimension.
As a final illustration of the randomness achieved by changing the zip code field of the site
cookie, Figure3 shows a full set of forty lags of high prices for the entire Depth sample.
In other research that tests for randomization, the authorsoften establish that the firm was
indifferent among the actions it was randomizing among, a direct implication of the model being
tested. In this case, we are unable to conduct such a test, as we do not observe sales figures at the
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Table 5: Testing for Serial Correlation
Dependent Variable: Indicator for High Price
Panel Setting: Across zip codes, Across Products,
Within Products Within zip code
Specification: (1) (2)
Lagged “High” Price Indicator −0.0006 −0.0090
(0.0007) (0.0073)
Controls
Zip code Fixed Effects X X
N 17,418 18,080
Panel Autocorrelation Test Statistic 0.0 1 0.046
P-value 0.9822 0.8330
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the product level.
different price levels. Therefore, it is impossible to say that the firm is indifferent between showing
the “high” and “low” price. However, in many models discussed in Section2, a firm would not
necessarily be indifferent between the two actions: it is the randomization itself that induces higher
overall profits from the overall strategy.
6 Relation to Offline Prices
Using the “Offline” sample introduced above we next investigate whether, and if so how, Staples’
online pricing strategy responds to offline prices, or its competitors’ prices. We rely on the data
compiled by mystery shoppers hired on the TaskRabbit platform who recorded prices for five
preselected products at two of each of the three chains’ outlets in 17 markets, and simultaneously
recorded the online prices for the five products on each competitors’ website when accessing the
websites from their home zip code. The resulting sample of 410 price observations from 85 retail
stores and 232 observations for online prices reveals the following.
First, there is no variation in Office Depot or OfficeMax’ online prices for any of the five
products across zip codes. The Staples’ competitors thus donot appear to be practicing spatial
price discrimination on their websites.
Second, we also observe limited variation in offline prices.The average coefficient of variation
in the five products’ prices across the 17 markets is 0.065 forStaples, 0.032 for Office Depot,
and 0.062 for OfficeMax; there are no systematic patterns across products in the degree of price
variation across markets: in Staples’ case, Post-It Notes have the largest coefficient of variation
in displayed prices with 0.11; for OfficeMax it is Scotch Tapewith a CV of 0.11, and for Office
Depot it is Address Labels with a CV of 0.06. Across stores, there is virtually no variation in the
price of Pilot pens, which could reflect contracting arrangements with Pilot.
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Figure 3: Lagged Autocorrelation in High Prices
Given this limited price variation, it is not surprising thaStaples’ online price score in the
sample store’s zip code is virtually uncorrelated with the tree chains’ chosen in-store price; the
correlation coefficient between the online price score and in-store prices is -0.03 for Staples’ prices,
0.01 for Office Depot’s prices, and -0.16 for OfficeMax’s prices. We thus conclude that Staples’
online price discrimination strategy is not in response to offline prices, or its competitors’ online
pricing behavior; the evidence suggests instead that online prices are set independently of offline
prices, as well as competitors’ pricing strategies, even thoug online price mixing responds to the
proximity of retail outlets to the customer, and thus the convenience with which a consumer could
shop at a competitor, rather than through Staples’ online channel.
7 Model of Firm Pricing Decisions
A number of models could generate equilibria where a monopolist r oligopolist chooses to ran-
domize among a set of prices systematically across markets.We take no stand on validating a
particular assumption taken in the literature; instead we propose a simple model, similar to that of
Sobel(1984) with a single good and a dominant firm, and with empirical demand objects instead
of stylized reservation prices.
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7.1 Model
A firm is selling a good that it can acquire at a constant marginl costc with no capacity constraint,
and is considering different prices to charge: a low pricepL > c, or a high pricepH > pL. There
are two types of consumers in a market. Loyal (high) types make up fractionα of consumers in
any time period, and bargain-hunter (low) types make up(1−α). Both types of consumers have
discrete-choice demand of the Logit form used widely in empirical work (McFadden, 1981). One
key difference between the two types is that the bargain-hunters do not consider buying a good at
a high price, only at a low price. Furthermore, a loyal customer who chooses to buy zero units in
a time period exits the market for the good, while with some probability ρ a bargain-hunter who
purchased no units in the same period remains in the market until the next period. We interpret
this as the bargain-hunter taking a draw from the distribution of prices charged by other firms in
the market when shown a high price, and returning to this firm if the price drawn is greater than
pH , which occurs with probabilityρ .
Consider a firm that charges a high price at all times. Demand ech period comes solely from
high-type customers, so expected profits are
πH = M ·
(
pH −c
)
·α ·sH
(
pH
)
(1)
whereM is the market size per time period andsH
(
pH
)
is the Logit demand function for high
types.
A firm could instead charge a low price at all times, earning profits from both segments of
consumers:
πL = M ·
(
pL −c
)
·
[
α ·sH
(
pL
)
+(1−α)sL
(
pL
)]
(2)
wheresL (·) is the demand function for low-type consumers.
Now suppose this firm is able to randomize prices, showing a high price with probabilityf .
In a time period where the high price is shown, the firm earnsπH . However, due to the behavior
of low types, when a low price is shown, the firm earns additional profit from past low-types who
purchased zero after seeing a high price. Expected profits are then
π f ,L = M ·
(
pL −c
)
·
[
α ·sH
(
pL
)
+(1−α)
(
1
1−ρ · f
)
sL
(
pL
)
]
(3)
Therefore, a firm that follows a randomization strategy earns total expected profits of
π = f ·πH +(1− f )π f ,L (4)
Intuitively, the randomization acts as a mechanism to separate types. The more “loyal” types
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there are in a market (higherα), the more the firm loses from showing a low price, and so it will put
a higher probability on the high price. Similarly, as the probability of market exit of the bargain-
hunters decreases (higherρ), the fewer customers are lost from showing high prices, andso the
firm will put a higher probability on high price.
To operationalize this model, we specify the demand of person i of typek∈ {L,H} as having
utility and purchase probability given pricep of
uik = δk−βkp+ εik
sk (p) =
exp(δk−βkp)
1+exp(δk−βkp)
whereεik is distribute i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value.
7.1.1 Solving the Model
The firm knows all demand parameters when choosing a pricing strategy. Optimal uniform prices
come from optimizing either equation1 (if serving high types only) or equation2 (if serving both
types).
For a firm choosing a randomizing strategy, the firm optimizesby choosingpH , pL, and f ∈
(0,1). Optimal choices are given from first-order conditions for each variable in equation4. The
optimalpH is the same price the firm would choose if it were only serving high types. The optimal
choices forpL and f are inter-dependent, as they interact in equation3.
7.1.2 Discussion
The mechanism at work is that charging multiple prices separates the two types of consumers,
allowing for price discrimination. The firm is able to earn the igh profits from high types on
occasion, without entirely sacrificing the low types. If there were a single rival charging a uniform
price, this firm would be better off charging the low price deterministically after an optimal amount
of time. However that cannot be an equilibrium as the rival would then want to “sweep” the low
types from the market immediately prior. The fact that the bargain-hunter takes a draw from a
distribution of rival firms means the firm can do no better thanthe randomizing strategy.
The behavior of the low types can be interpreted in several ways. One way is that low type de-
mand is given by a discrete-continuous model of demand, as inHanemann(1984) orDubin and McFadden
(1984), so that instead of “staying in the market” with some probability after observing a high price,
these consumers have zero demand at high prices but demand greater than one unit of the good at
low prices. Another interpretation is that a low-type searches for a similar but different product
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after observing a high price, such as a substitute good within the same product category, where the
firm is employing the same randomization strategy on different goods.
Finally, given that the optimal low pricepL is a function of the rest of the parameters, which
vary at the zip code level, it should be the case that the low price varies across zip codes. In practice
we do not see this, but at our parameter estimates the range ofoptimal low prices is small, and so
it is reasonable to impose that the low price is constant across zip codes.
7.2 Estimation
Our Breadth data show a single high and low price across all markets for a standard Swingline
stapler, with f varying across markets in response to local market conditios. Since we do not
observe quantity data, we calibrate the demand parametersβk andδk, k ∈ {L,H}, to rationalize
the high and low prices we observe, $14.29 and $15.79 in this case (calibrated values are in Ap-
pendix Table9). We then want to estimate zip code-levelαz, the share of loyal customers, and
ρz, the search parameter, as a function of local characteristics. Given our reduced-form analysis of
covariates, we choose to model them as follows:
αz = α0+ γ ·dz
ρz = ρ0+η ·yz
wheredz is log of the minimum distance from zip code z to either an OfficeMax or Office
Depot location,yz is the log of the number of establishments in zip codez from the census, and
θ = {α0,γ,ρ0,η} is a parameter vector to estimate.
Given a parameter vectorθ , we can compute the optimalfz for zip codez as the profit-
maximizing probability of showing high prices.
fz(αz,ρz,θ) = argmaxf π ( f ,θ)
We then compare that to the observed high price frequency in the data,f 0z , and estimate the
parameter vector via minimum distance.
θ̂ = argminθ
Z
∑
z=1
( fz(θ)− f 0z )
2
Note that the estimation routine does not weight according to zip code populations or other
characteristics; all zip codes are weighted equally as eachis a realization of the model for an
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individual market.
7.3 Results
The results of the estimation exercise are displayed in Table6.
Table 6: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: Indicator for High Price
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
α0 −0.4360 (0.0297)
γ 0.7034 (0.0311)
ρ0 0.9403 (0.0088)
η −0.0533 (0.0066)
N 24,855
Notes: Standard errors are computed via subsampling. Distance to competition and log number of
establishments are normalized to have means of one in the sample.
These estimates imply that the share of “loyal” types Staples.com has in a zip code is increasing
in the distance to rivals, and the probability of searching again among bargain-hunter types is
falling in the number of establishments in the zip code. The figures below show the distribution of
values ofαz andρz across zip codes.
Figure 4: Estimated Distributions of Loyal Types Across Zip Codes
Figure 6 shows the joint distribution ofα and ρ across zip codes, along with the optimal
probability of showing a high price. Intuitively, if there are more loyal types, or if the probability
of searching again is high, a higher frequency for the high price is optimal.
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Figure 5: Estimated Distributions of Search Parameter Across Zip Codes
The estimates imply that engaging in randomization is strictly more profitable than either only
serving the high types by always charging a high price in all markets, or the strategy of serving
both types by always charging a low price in all markets. Table7 shows that profits fall from either
alternative strategy, although much more so when the firm only serves the high types in the market.
This is consistent with Figure6 and the fact that most markets have an optimalf between zero and
one, but that there is more mass in the lower range off , and many markets have an optimalf of
zero.
Table 7: Profits Under Different Strategies
Change in Average Profit
Base Case -
Always chargepH (19.88%)
Always chargepL (1.71%)
Notes: The table presents simple averages across zipcodes in the change in profit from an alternate
strategy relative to the randomization strategy.
7.4 Implications and Discussion
Table8 shows some basic simulations that illustrate the implications of the model estimates. We
first show the effect of increasing rival distances by 20% andincreasing number of establishments
by 20%; both have modest effects on the effective average pric shown in the entire sample, al-
though the distance to rival carries more weight. A 20% increase in distance to the nearest rival
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Figure 6: Joint Distribution of Loyal Types and Search Parameter
implies a nearly 32% increase in the share of “loyal” types, while increasing the number of estab-
lishments in the zip code by 20% decreases the probability ofsearching again by a little over 1%.
The final column uses data on the change in OfficeMax and Office Depot store locations in 2014
as a result of their merger to determine the effect on “loyal”types in a market for Staples.com. The
merger affects the distance to the nearest store for 6.3% of zip codes in our sample. The increase
is generally modest as the chain eliminates locations that overlap between the two chains.
Table 8: Model Estimates and Simulations
Scenario: Base Case Increase Rival Increase Number of Use 2014 Rival
Distance 20% Establishments 20% Distances
Averageαz 0.3229 0.4253 0.3229 0.3280
Averageρz 0.8870 0.8870 0.8772 0.8870
Averagefz 0.3366 0.4427 0.3236 0.3415
Average displayed price $14.79 $14.95 $14.77 $14.81
Average transaction price $14.69 $14.85 $14.68 $14.70
Notes: Averages are presented across zip codes and are unweighted. The average displayed price is
calculated asfz× pH +(1− fz)× pL, while the average transaction price recognizes that some
low types remain in the market for multiple periods, resulting n an average transaction price of
fz×α × pH +(1− fz)×
(
α +(1−α)×
(
1
1−ρ· fz
))
pL.
While the predicted price increase from the merger is small,it can still imply a significant
dollar value given the size of the site and the fact it can be applied to a large selection of products.
To put these estimates in context, in 2013, Staples reported$10.4B in online revenue. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation says that if their rivals’ mergerallows them to raise prices by even 1% on
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roughly half of their product selection, with little demandresponse, they could see a profit increase
of $50M.
8 Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions to the literature onpricing. First, we test for and document a
case of a firm using a mixed pricing strategy for posted pricesin an online marketplace. Second, we
document the relationship between online and offline pricing for a major product market. Third, we
estimate a model for online price discrimination consistent with our data and use it to quantify the
magnitudes of the competitive forces on pricing. Our results show that online price discrimination
can be an effective tool for firms, and that it is sensitive to offline alternatives. This work revisits
large literatures in marketing and economics on price dispersion and price discrimination, and
has implications for policy as merger analysis should take into account online price effects from
industry consolidation. As pointed out byMikians et al.(2012), online price discrimination is
difficult to detect but widespread, and work such asMikians et al.(2013) shows the challenge in
analyzing such behavior.
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Appendix
Table 9: Calibrated Demand Parameters
Parameter Bargain-Hunter Loyal
δ 1 3
β 0.275 0.255
c $10.46 $10.46
Notes: Cost value is the lowest available price on Amazon Marketplace for the Swingline Stapler
featured in the WSJ article. These values generate optimal prices of $14.29 for the Bargain-Hunter
and $15.79 for the loyal.
Figure 7: Contents of Sample “Cookie” From Staples.com
#LWP-Cookies-1.0
Set-Cookie3: SSID=BgAS-B1GAAAABADxXoFRyMEAAvFegVEBAAAAAAd7ahR8V6BUQC3vmAB
path="/"; domain=.staples.com; path_spec; expires="2014-05-01 18:29:05Z"; ver-
sion=0
Set-Cookie3: SSPV=E2AAAAAAAAhCrTEAAAAAAAAAAI8QAAAAAA A;
path="/"; domain=.staples.com; path_spec; expires="2014-05-01 21:56:42Z"; ver-
sion=0
Set-Cookie3: SSRT=Ko-BUQE; path="/"; domain=.staples.com; path_spec;
expires="2014-05-01 21:54:50Z"; version=0
Set-Cookie3: sslb=B; path="/"; domain=.staples.com; path_spec; expires="2013-
05-31 18:34:05Z"; version=0
Set-Cookie3: zipcode=04858; path="/"; domain=.staples.com; path_spec;
expires="2033-04-26 18:29:05Z"; version=0
Set-Cookie3: langPref=%2d1; path="/"; domain=www.staples.com; path_spec;
expires="2033-04-26 18:29:04Z"; version=0
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